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FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL UNIONS
PATRICIA A. CAIN*

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2000, Vermont's Civil Union law took effect. I In the2
following twelve months, Vermont officials recorded 2,479 civil unions.
Only 502 of these unions occurred between couples who are residents of
Vermont.3 Such couples, although not called "spouses" under the law,
experience all the same benefits and burdens of marriage that Vermont
spouses experience within the state of Vermont. 4 In addition, the only way
to dissolve a civil union is through a judicial proceeding exactly like a
divorce. 5 Extra-territorial recognition of civil unions is as yet an
unresolved issue. 6 Federal recognition of civil unions has also not yet been
tested.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which provides, in part that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex
Copyright © 2001, Patricia Cain.
Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa. Special Thanks to my research
*
assistant, Melissa Goodman, for timely and efficient research.
Carey Goldberg, QUIET ANNIVERSARY FOR CIVIL UNIONS, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
I
2001, at A14.
Id.
2
Id.
3
VT. STAT ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a)(200 1).
4
§ 1204(d). "The law of domestic relations, including annulment, separation and
5
divorce, child custody and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to
parties to a civil union." Id.
Although there are no reported cases yet, the Georgia Court of Appeals has a case
6
before it that raises the issue of whether a lesbian couple united in a civil union are
"related" under Georgia law. Burns v. Bums, No. 00-CV-19891-1 (GA Super. Ct. JAN 30,
2000). Recognition of the relationship would allow the couple to enjoy joint visitation with
the two children of one the partners, visitation that had been restricted by the divorce court.
See id. The trial court ruled that the mother of the children was in violation of the custody
and visitation order which prohibited her from visiting her own children while in the
company of an unrelated adult. See id.
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Thus, if and when any state recognizes same-sex marriage, "same-sex
spouses" will not be recognized as "spouses" for purposes of federal tax
8
law if DOMA remains good law.
Some have argued that DOMA is unconstitutional. 9 Testing DOMA's
constitutionality, however, is problematic.
Since no state in fact

recognizes same-sex marriage, there are no same-sex spouses to challenge
the application of the law to them. Given the Supreme Court's narrow
view of "standing,"' 0 some have opined that the provision cannot yet be
tested. 11

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2001).
8
The second provision in DOMA is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2001), which
provides:
7

No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
This article is not directly concerned with this provision since it applies to state
recognition rather than recognition by the federal government. However, a couple residing
in a state other than Vermont may argue for federal recognition of their civil union. In that
event, recognition by the domiciliary state would become an issue in their federal tax
claims.
9
See, e.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of
FundamentalistChristianity,4 MiCH. J. GENDER & L. 335 (1997); Jon-Peter Kelly, Note,
Act of Infidelity: Why the Defense of MarriageAct is Unfaithful to the Constitution, 7
CORNELL J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 203 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the
Defense ofMarriageAct is Unconstitutional,83 IOWA L. REV. I (1997); Barbara A. Robb,
Note, The Constitutionalityofthe Defense of MarriageAct in the Wake ofRomer v. Evans,
32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263 (1997); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of MarriageAct
and the Overextension of CongressionalAuthority, 97 COLum. L. REV. 1435 (1997); Mark
Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the
Constitution, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 279 (1997); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, The
Supreme Court's Decision in Romer v. Evans and its Implications for the Defense of
MarriageAct, 16 QuINNIAC L. REv. 217 (1996).
10
See. e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). But see Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (relaxing the "injury in
fact" requirement for certain environmental citizen suits).
I I See, e.g., Brett P. Ryan, Love and Let Love: Same-Sex Marriage,Past, Present,
and Future, and the Constitutionality of DOMA, 22 U. HAW. L. REv. 185, 224 n.280
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In this article, I describe the application of federal tax law to taxpayers
who are recognized as spousal equivalents under Vermont's civil union
laws. If DOMA does not apply to such taxpayers, and there are certainly
strong arguments that it does not, 12 then federal tax law will have to take
into account the aspects of civil union relationships that I describe in this
article. On the other hand, if the IRS argues that DOMA does apply to any
of the situations described in this article, then the taxpayer in such a case
will have standing to challenge the constitutionality of DOMA.
Vermont couples who fit within any of the situations I delineate in this
article should be interested in the possible tax outcomes that I describe. In
addition, public interest lawyers,, interested in furthering the cause of
lesbian and gay equality, should familiarize themselves with the intricacies
of the tax law that I discuss in this article. Vermont couples who are
parties to a civil union are in an ideal position to challenge the
discriminatory aspects of federal tax law and perhaps the constitutionality
of DOMA as well. Same-sex couples in other states may also be able to
mount such challenges so long as their states recognized the legally
binding nature of their relationships, or, through state law, assign
to them
13
responsibilities and benefits similar to those assigned to spouses.
II. STATE LAW SOMETIMES DETERMINES FEDERAL TAX
CONSEQUENCES
A. Family Relationships
There is no federal law of marriage and domestic relations. 14 Federal
16
15
tax law, however, often relies on concepts such as marriage, divorce,
(2000). But see Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage,25
VT. L. REv. 15, 54 n.250 (2000).
12
Johnson, supra note 11, at 55 (pointing out that narrowly construed, DOMA
would not apply to civil unions). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice:
Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudenceof Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REv. 853, 861 (2001)
(arguing that federal agencies could construe DOMA to deny marital benefits to civil union
couples).
13
See, e.g., California Family Code §297, recognizing same-sex domestic
partnerships for limited purposes.
14
See Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1978)("The State . . . has absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which it may be dissolved"); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)("[T]he laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns
traditionally reserved to the states."); United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir.
1997)("... there is no federal law of marriage.. ."). See also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570 (1956)(applying California state law to define the word "children" in a case
involving the application of federal copyright laws to residents of California). The Supreme
Court states that "there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter
of state concern." Id. at 571-72.
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18

parent-child relationships,
stepchildren,
children by adoption, 19
20
mothers-in-law, and other family relationships. In order to determine
who fits within these categories, federal tax law must rely on state family
law.2 1 Thus, for example, the relationship
of husband and wife is
22
determined by state, rather than federal, law.
The IRS explains:
[t]he marital status of individuals as determined under
state law is recognized in the administration of the Federal
income tax laws. Therefore, if applicable state law
recognizes common-law marriages, the status of
individuals living in such relationship that the state would
treat them as husband and wife is, for Federal income tax
purposes, that of husband and wife.
The foregoing position of the Internal Revenue Service
with respect to a common-law marriage is equally
applicable in the case of taxpayers who enter into a
common-law marriage in a state which recognizes such
relationship and who later move into a state in which a
23
ceremony is required to initiate the marital relationship.
As a technical matter, parties to a civil union are not married. Thus,
they cannot file joint returns. 24 Even if they were married, DOMA would
16
E.g., § 71 (relating to taxation of alimony paid pursuant to a divorce or separation
agreement).
17
E.g., § 2 (relating to head of household filings if child is a member of the
household); § 32 (EITC is increased if taxpayer and child share same principal place of
abode); §§ 151-152 (deductions for personal exemptions).
is
Id.
19
Id.
20
A person who supports a mother-in-law, father-in law, son-in-law, daughter-inlaw, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law, can claim a dependency exemption without having to
rely on the more limited "member of the household" test contained in I.R.C. § 152(a)(9). §
152(aX8). Support of an in-law might also qualify the taxpayer for head of household filing
status. § 2(b)(l)(A)(ii).
21
See supra note 14. The Internal Revenue Code does not contain general
definitions of family relationships. In some instances, regulations and rulings fill in the
blanks. See Rev. Rul. 84-89, 1984-1 C.B. 5, holding that the term "child" for head of
household filing purposes includes "foster child." Treas. Reg. § 1.152-2(C)(4)(1 973) defines
foster child as a child "who is in the care of a person or persons (other than the parents or
adopted parents of the child)."
22
See Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
23
Id.
24
See I.R.C. § 6013 (permitting "a husband and wife" to file ajoint return).
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prevent their marriage from being recognized for purposes of federal tax
law. 2 5 Nonetheless, since parties to a civil union are treated the same as
spouses under Vermont law 2 6 , a party to a civil union will have
"stepparent" and "in-law" relationships that unmarried taxpayers generally
do not have. 2 7 In addition, if two lesbians have registered their civil union
and one of them then gives birth to a child, the other partner can argue that
she is presumed to be the other parent, relying on a statutory provision that
presumes a husband to be the parent of a child born to his wife. 2 8 For
example, if Betty and Alice are parties to a civil union in Vermont and then
Alice gives birth to a child, Vermont law will presume that Betty is the
other parent. In this event, since Betty is recognized as a parent under state
law, she should also be recognized as a parent under federal tax law.
In the remainder of this section, I will describe several situations in
which Vermont Civil Union law creates family relationships that can make
a difference under the federal tax laws. In all of the situations I describe
below, either DOMA does not apply because it is limited to true same-sex
marriage cases or it does apply in which case the taxpayer has standing to
challenge DOMA's constitutionality. Although I do not develop the
constitutional argument in this section, I suggest here that each fact
situation presents an extremely strong case for recognition of the family
relationship because the relationship is real. Vermont law creates real
family relationships with real consequences.

See U.S.C. § 7 (defining "spouse" and "marriage" as referring only to opposite
25
sex relationships).
26
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2000).
See discussion in part lI(A)(I) and (2) infra.
See, e.g., VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308 (2001), which provides:
A person alleged to be a parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a
child if:
27

28

(1) the alleged parent fails to submit without good cause to genetic
testing as ordered; or

(2) the alleged parents have voluntarily acknowledged parentage under
the laws of this state or any other state, by filling out and signing a
Voluntary Acknowledgement of Parentage form and filing the
completed and witnessed form with the department of health; or
(3) the probability that the alleged parent is the biological parent
exceeds 98 percent as established by a scientifically reliable genetic
test; or
(4) the child is born while the husband and wife are legally married to

each other.
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I do not mean to suggest that same-sex committed relationships outside
Vermont are not "real." I simply mean to stress the fact that the legal
consequences of a civil union are different from the legal consequences
that flow from other domestic partner relationships. In Vermont, the state
imposes legal responsibilities on married couples 29 and, similarly, on
couples who are parties to a civil union. 30 By contrast, a domestic partner
couple in other states may have contracted for similar responsibilities, but
those responsibilities are imposed
as a matter of contract law, 3 1 not as a
32
matter of state family law.
Even if the couple has not contracted for such responsibilities, they
may feel those responsibilities as moral obligations. Moral obligations, in
my view, can be as "real" as those imposed by state law. The IRS,
however, takes a different view of the matter. For example, no matter how
morally obligated I may feel to support my indigent mother, the IRS will
treat my support fayments to her as taxable gifts to the extent they exceed
$10,000 a year. 33 That is because, in the view of the 34IRS, moral
obligations do not equal state-imposed obligations of support.
Since even the IRS would have to agree that obligations imposed by
state family law are "real," parties to a Vermont Civil Union are ideally
situated to challenge any nonrecognition of their relationships by federal
29

VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 291 (2001) (dealing with spouse's failure to support).

30

VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (Supp. 2001).

31

In most states such contracts will be enforceable. See eg. Marvin v. Marvin, 557

P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). But see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (111.1979) (holding

that it is against public policy to enforce cohabitant agreements because cohabitation is
against public policy; marriage is the preferred relationship). No same-sex case has directly
challenged Hewitt, although it is difficult to apply its public policy rationale, support of

marriage, to a case involving a same-sex couple who cannot marry in any event. Some
states require cohabitation agreements to be in writing. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM.CoDE
ANN. § 26.01(a), (b)(3) (Vernon 1987); Zaremba v. Clibum, 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.
1997) (applying statute to gay male couple).
32
But see the newly enacted California Domestic Partner statute at Family Code
§297(bX2), which imposes a mutual obligation of support for basic living expenses. While
this statute has yet to be construed, the language clearly sets forth an obligation of support.

33

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318 (father's payments of hospital bills

and living expenses of son and son's family held as taxable gifts); Rev. Rul 82-98, 1982-1
C.B. 141 (parent support of adult disabled child held as taxable gifts). See Robert G.
Popovich, Support Your Family ,but Leave out Uncle Sam: A Callfor Federal Gift Tax

Reform, 55 MD. L. REv. 343 (1996); see also Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the
Federal Tax Laws, I L. & SEXUALrTY 97 (1991) (arguing that support payments by one
partner for the joint consumption of both partners should not be viewed as taxable gifts
because they are not transfers of property and such payments do not constitute the sort of
estate depleting transfers that the gift tax was intended to cover).
34

Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032 (June 1, 1981).
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tax law as violative of equal protection. 3 5 A taxpayer who is a party to a
civil union in Vermont is not just "similarly situated" to a married taxpayer
in Vermont, but rather is in exactly the same situation as a married
taxpayer. 36 Thus, to deprive a Vermont taxpayer of any benefit linked to
I describe in this article raises a plausible
one of the family relationships
37
equal protection claim.

1. Parent-childRelationships
There are no Code provisions or published regulations or rulings that
define son or daughter, child or stepchild. Tax authorities may think the
definitions of these terms are obvious, but in a changing world, nothing is
obvious about family relationships. For good reason, the IRS has always
relied on state law definitions of family relationships. 38 In recent years,
state law definitions have become hotly contested. The availability of
modem reproductive technology has contributed to the contest. 3 9 Gay and
lesbian families have4 0also contributed their share to the ongoing debate
over who is a family.
a. Presumptionof Parenthood.
As noted above, Vermont law provides that a "person alleged to be a
parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a child if...
the child is born while the husband and wife are legally married to each
other."'4 1 The civil union statute explicitly provides that:
[the] rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a
child of whom either becomes the natural parent during the
term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a
married couple, with respect to a child of whom either
42
spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.
Thus, as asserted above, if Alice and Betty enter into a civil union and
then Alice gives birth to a child, Betty should be presumed to be the other
See discussion in part III infra.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (200 1)
37
See discussion in part III. infra.
See Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
38
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing that two
39
mothers can assert competing parenthood claims when one is the gestational mother and the
other is the genetic mother); see also Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (1998).
40
See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
35
36

Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional

Families, 78 GEo. L. J. 459 (1990); Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers
...and a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1996).
VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2001).
41
42
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2001).
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parent. Although the parentage statute states that the presumption is
rebuttable, 4 3 the statute provides no hint as to how the presumption might
be rebutted. In the most recent Vermont case dealing with this
presumption, the majority ruled that biological evidence of non-paternity
will not rebut the presumption once the parent-child relationship is
established and child support payments have been ordered by a divorce
court. 4 4 To make sense of the parentage statute as embossed by the civil
union statute, one must conclude that biology is irrelevant to the
determination of parentage. The Vermont Supreme Court has expressed a
similar view.4 5 "Indeed, the presumption of paternity has assumed even
greater significance today, as alternative methods of conception unrelated
46
to the "biology" of the presumed parent have become more common."
To clarify the parent-child relationship, same-sex partners will
probably be advised to go through an adoption to resolve the question of
whether the nonbiological parent is a parent under Vermont law.
Alternatively, the nonbiological parent might ask for a statutory declaration
of paternity. 47 Although the adoption process is likely to be speedier in
Vermont than it is in other states since Vermont will treat adoptions within
a civil union the same as stepparent adoptions, 4 8 the process will still take
some time. When children are born late in the tax year, it might not be
possible to finalize an adoption by year's end. In such cases, relying on the
presumption of parentage will be be necessary in order to establish a
parent-child relationship for tax filing purposes.
In cases in which the second mother is the primary breadwinner, the
ability to claim the child as her own creates important tax savings. In the
previous example, assume that Betty agreed to support Alice during her
pregnancy and through childbirth. Assume further that their daughter Kath
was born on December 17, just two weeks before the end of the tax year.
Because Betty and Alice are not married for federal tax purposes, Betty
will file as a single taxpayer. 4 9 However, if she can establish that Kath is
her daughter, Betty will be able to file using the more favorable head of
household rates.

43

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308 (2001).

44
46

Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910-11 (Vt. 1998).
Id. at 910.
Id.

47

Such declarations have been obtained by second parents in California lesbian

45

couples who argue that under California's judicially created doctrine of intentional

parenthood, the second parent, without whom the biological mother would never have
agreed to give birth, is an intentional parent. See, e.g., In re Petition of Carhart and
Hollingsworth, No. F054887 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 11, 1999).
48
See VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2001)
49
See I.R.C. § 6013 (2001) (limiting filing ofjoint returns to a "husband and wife").
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A person qualifies as head of household 50 if she: (1) shares a home
with her own child or certain related individuals 51 and (2) maintains the
home by providing over half the cost of maintenance during the tax year,
and (3) the child or other related individual lives in the home for more than
half the year.52 The head of household rates are midway between joint
return rates and the rates for single taxpayers. 5 3 Thus, they provide some
benefit of income splitting between Betty and her child, Kath.
Furthermore, since Betty is the primary breadwinner, she will be providing
over half the costs of maintaining the home for the year. In this event,
Alice, even if she has taxable income for the year, will not qualify for head
54
of household status.
Federal tax law ought to recognize Betty as the parent of Kath because
Vermont law recognizes the relationship. 5 5 In a similar fact situation, the
California State Board of Equalization recognized the parent in Betty's
position as a parent for head of household filing status under California
57
income tax laws. 56 California uses federal definitions for filing status.
Thus, the argument presented to the Board of Equalization is the same
argument that Betty would rely on for her federal taxes. The argument is
simple: state law determines the parent-child relationship and federal law
must recognize any such relationship.
Other tax benefits accrue to parents in Betty's position. They include
the child tax credit 58 and the earned income tax credit. 59 Neither of these
credits are available to a taxpayer who merely supports a minor child.

50

51

I.R.C. § 2(b) (2001).
While an unrelated individual, such as a domestic partner's child, can be claimed

as a dependent for federal income tax purposes under I.R.C. § 152(a)(9)'s "member of the
household" test, only related individuals can qualify a taxpayer for head of household

status. I.R.C. § 2(b) (2001).
52

Treasury Regulations provide that if the child is born during the year, then the

half year provision is satisfied so long as the "household constitutes the principal place of
abode of such [child] for the remaining ...
part of such taxable year." Treas. Reg. § 1.22(c)(1) (1971).
53

I.R.C. § 1 (2001).

54
55

§ 2(b).

56

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2001).
In re Appeal of Helmi A. Hisserich, No. 99A-0341, 2000 WL 1880484, at *5

(Cal. St. Rd. Equilization Nov. 1, 2001). The parent-child relationship was based on the
California doctrine of intentional parenthood. ld.
57
See Rihn v. Franchise Tax Bd., 280 P.2d 893, 895-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
ss
I.R.C. § 24 (2001).
59
I.R.C. § 32 (2001).
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60
Rather, the taxpayer must be related to the child as a parent or stepparent.
6
1
Alternatively, the child may be an "eligible foster child."
Perhaps the greatest benefit to children in recognizing this parent/child
relationship lies in the tax treatment of employer-provided health benefits.
Vermont employers who provide benefits to an employee's children will
include Kath as a beneficiary on Betty's policy. In most such fact
situations, Kath, whether adopted by Betty or not, will likely qualify as
Betty's dependent under Section 152(a)(9), the "member of the household"
test.6 2 However, recognition of the parent-child relationship would make
the "member of the household" test irrelevant. 63 Thus, any employerprovided medical benefits for Kath would clearly be nontaxable to Betty if
Kath is recognized as Betty's child. Any such payments for the benefit of
Alice, however, would be taxable unless Alice satisfied the "member of the
household" test. This is because parties to a civil union are not a
recognized category for federal tax parties. 64 The tax issues raised by
employer-provided health benefits will be discussed further in Part III of
this article.

b. Stepparents.

The stepparent/stepchild relationship is also sufficient to qualify Betty
for head of household filing status, the child tax credit, and the earned
income tax credit provided she meets its other requirements. 6 5 Under
Vermont law, Betty would be a stepparent as to any of Alice's children
including those born before the beginning of their civil union
relationship. 6 6 DOMA might appear more directly relevant here because
60
§§ 32(c)(3)(B)(i)(I) and (11). The relationship test under Section 32 applies to
Section 24 as well. See § 24(c)(I)(C).
61
§ 32(c)(3)(B)(i)(11I). Treasury Regulation promulgated under Section 152 defines
a foster child as a child "who is in the care of a person or persons (other than the parents or
adopted parents of the child)." Treas. Reg. § 1.152-2(C)(4) (1973). Kath would not qualify
as Betty's foster child since she is in the care of her parent, Alice, as well as in the care of
Betty.
62
This test is likely to be met in the case of Alice, Betty and Kath since the facts
assume they all live in the same household and Betty is the one supporting both Alice and
Kath. See I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) (2001).
63
See § 152(a)(1) (a child of the taxpayer is a dependent so long as the taxpayer
provided over half the support for the child).
64
See generally § 152.
65
For Example, Betty's income must fall below the "earned income amount."
I.R.C. § 32 (2001).
66
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b) (2001). provides that (stating [a] party to a civil
union shall be included in any definition or use of the terms "spouse," "family," "immediate
family," "dependent," "next of kin," and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as
those terms are used throughout the law).

HeinOnline -- 30 Cap. U. L. Rev. 396 2002

2002]

FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL UNIONS

397

the IRS could argue that the only way to recognize Betty as a stepparent is
to view the union with Alice as a marriage, something that DOMA
arguably forbids.
In response, Betty might argue that since a "stepparent" is not defined
by the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS should recognize the relationship if
it is recognized under state law. She might also argue that the purpose of
DOMA was to prevent same-sex spouses (and arguably spousal
equivalents) from enjoying federal tax benefits that are intended to support
the marriage relationship. The House Report in support of passage of
DOMA stated:
Government currently provides an array of material and
other benefits to married couples in an effort to promote,
protect, and prefer the institution of marriage. While the
Committee has not undertaken an exhaustive examination
of those benefits, it is clear that they do impose certain
fiscal obligations on the federal government. For example,
survivorship benefits paid to the surviving spouse of a
veteran of the Armed Services plainly cost the federal
government money.
If Hawaii (or some other State) were to permit
homosexuals to "marry," these marital benefits would,
absent some legislative response, presumably have to be
made available to homosexual couples and surviving
spouses of homosexual "marriages" on the same terms as
they are now available to opposite-sex married couples
and spouses. To deny federal recognition to same-sex
"marriages" will thus preserve scarce government
67
resources, surely a legitimate government purpose.
Thus, when passing DOMA, Congress had in mind federal tax benefits
that directly benefit spouses rather than benefits that are directed at
children. 68 Head of household status, the child tax credit, and the
increased EITC for a parent with a child are all examples of federal tax
benefits that were enacted for the benefit of dependent children. 69

67

H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,

2922.
6s

See id.

"The income of a head of household who must maintain a home for a child, for
example, is likely to be shared with the child to the extent necessary to maintain the home,
and raise and educate the child. This, it is believed, justifies the extension of some of the
benefits of income splitting." H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 11 (1951), reprinted in 1951
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781, 1790. For a thorough discussion of the legislative provision as
69
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As further support for her position, Betty might cite to the Vermont
statute on liability of stepparents to support their stepchildren which
provides:
A stepparent has a duty to support a stepchild if they (sic)
reside in the same household and if the financial resources
of the natural or adoptive parents are insufficient to
provide the child with a reasonable subsistence consistent
with decency and health. The duty of a stepparent to
support a stepchild under this section shall be coextensive
with and enforceable according to the same terms as the
duty of a natural or adoptive parent to support a natural or
adoptive child including any such duty of support as exists
under the common law of this state, for so long as the
marital bond creating the step relationship shall
70
continue.
Since she is obligated to support Alice's children, head of household
reporting status for Betty would be justified as a matter of policy. Vermont
law makes Betty more than a temporary visitor in a household with a child
or children. 71 It gives her a legal relationship to Alice's children and
imposes support obligations on her with respect to them. 72
Indeed, it would be to the advantage of the federal fisc to recognize the
stepparent relationship in some cases. For example, the EITC, which is a
refundable credit for low-income taxpayers, is restricted to the parent in the
household who has the higher income. 73 The higher the income, the lower
the credit due to its phaseout at higher levels of income. 74 Thus, if Betty's
salary is above the "phaseout amount" and Alice's is not, recognition of
Betty's stepparent relationship would disqualify the household from
receiving any benefit from the EITC.
Finally, the taxation of employer-provided medical benefits again
becomes relevant. The tax code defines a stepchild as a dependent of the
taxpayer, provided the taxpayer provides over half the support for the
child. 75 Otherwise, the taxpayer would have to rely on the "member of the
household" test, which requires the child to be a member of the taxpayer's
originally enacted and also as amended in 1954, see Grace v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 685
(1969).
70
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (2001).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(C) (2001) ("[i]f 2 or more individuals would., be treated as
eligible individuals with respect to the same qualifying child., only the individual with the
highest modified adjusted gross income.., shall be treated as an eligible individual").
74
§ 32(b).
75
§ 152(a)(2).
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year. 76

household for the entire taxable
Although temporary absences,
including visitation of the child's other parent under a custody agreement,
77
will not prevent a child from qualifying as a member of the household,
such questions about temporary absences need not arise if the child is
recognized as the taxpayer's stepchild.
2. In-law Relationships.
Dependency exemptions can be claimed for a limited number of
related individuals including in-laws. 7 8 Dependency. exemptions are also
available for persons unrelated to the taxpayer, but these unrelated persons
must qualify under a stricter dependency test known as the "member of the
household" test. 7 9 Under the "member of the household" test, not only
must the taxpayer provide over half the support of the claimed dependent,
but the claimed dependent must also be a member of the taxpayer's
household for the full tax year.8 0 Thus, the major difference is that a
taxpayer who supports a related person (including certain "in-laws") can
claim a dependency exemption for that person regardless of where that
person lives. 8 1 In addition, if the related dependent lives with the taxpayer
during the year in a home maintained by the taxpayer, then the taxpayer
can qualify for head of household filing status. 8 2 For example, if Alice and
Betty have no children, but Betty is supporting Alice and Alice's younger
sister, then Betty can claim them both as dependents. 83 Alice is a
dependent under the "member of the household" test.8 4 The sister,
however, is a sister-in-law under Vermont law. 85 Supporting her sister-inlaw in Betty's own household should qualify Betty for head of household
86
filing status.
As with the stepparent/stepchild relationship, in-law relationships are
not possible unless Alice and Betty are treated as spouses. Vermont law

78

Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971).
Id.
I.R.C. § 152(a)(8) (2001).

79

§ 152(a)(9).

76
77

Id. In addition, to be claimed as a dependent, the person must not have income
above the "exemption amount." § 151(d).
81
Compare § 152(a)(9) (requiring the person to be claimed as a dependent to have
the taxpayer's home as his principal place of abode) with § 152(a)(8) (not containing a
residency requirement).
82
See § 2(b).
83
Assuming that neither Alice nor her sister has a gross income in excess of the
exemption amount.
84
See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971).
85
VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b) (2001).
86
I.R.C. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2001).
80
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treats them as spouses and so creates the "in-law" relationship. 87 "In-law"
relationships are nowhere defined in the Internal Revenue Code or related
rulings and regulations. Thus, it would be appropriate to rely on state
law. 8 8 However, the IRS can argue that DOMA prevents recognition of
the relationship in the absence of an opposite-sex marriage. 8 9 In that case,
the constitutionality of DOMA is at issue and Betty has standing to pursue
the challenge. 90
B. PropertyRights
"State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts
designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed." 9 1 This
statement is consistent with the general rule that, in applying federal law,
federal courts will turn to state law whenever federal law is silent about a
relevant topic. 9 2 While the Commissioner is not bound by lower state
court decisions that determine individual property rights unless he is a
party to that decision, 93 the Commissioner must nonetheless follow the
substantive property law of a state in the absence of a federal rule to the
94

contrary.
Nowhere is this rule that state property law controls tax
consequences 95 more evident than in the cases dealing with the property

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b).
87
See Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (stating that state land is recognized in the
88
administration of Federal income tax laws).
89
See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2001).
infra.
See discussion in part III
90
91
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940) (holding that a power of
appointment is a general power for federal estate tax purposes if under state law the holder
of the power could point to herself, her estate, or her creditors); see also U.S. v. Mitchell,
403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) ("In the determination of ownership, state law controls.")
92
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2001) provides "[tlhe laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply."
93
See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); see also Scott v.
Commissioner, 226 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a state probate determination that
lesbian partners owned property equally is not determinative in a federal estate tax
proceeding in which Commissioner asserted that decedent owned 100% of the property).
See I U.S.C. § 1652 (2001).
94
95
State property law can also determine the judicial outcome in constitutional law
questions dealing with property, such as takings and due process claims. See, e.g., Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), stating:

Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
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interests of married couples. Early on, the state community property
system in California did not sufficiently vest a wife in the earnings of her
husband to avoid taxing the earnings one hundred percent to the husband
even though he had assigned half of the earnings to her.96 The community
property laws of the state of Washington, by contrast, did sufficiently vest
both spouses in the earnings to allow husbands and wives to split the
income between them for federal income tax purposes.9 7 This differential

treatment of community property and common law states together with
Congress's attempts to minimize the differences is the primary reason that
98
the joint return filing option now exists.

Federal law can trump state property law and it has done so numerous
times with respect to community property. For example, federal law can
limit a community property spouse's rights upon divorce in railroad
retirement benefits 99 and in military retired pay. 10 0 Similarly, federal law
can assign community property retirement plans to a surviving second
spouse, thereby divesting the estate of the first spouse of her community
share of the plan. 10 1 So long as the federal outcome does not constitute an
unconstitutional taking of vested property rights, the federal law will
2
control.

10

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
See also Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprnklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 49 (2001) (looking to California law
to determine existence of property interest); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
40 (1999) (looking to Pennsylvania law to determine existence of property interest).
96
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
97
Poev. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, I1 (1930).
98
Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and SeparateSpheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles
in the 1940s, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 259, 266 (1988).
99
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583-87 (1979).
10O McCarry v. McCarry, 453 U.S. 210, 221-32 (1981).
101 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997) (holding that E.R.I.S.A. pre-empts
state community property laws when state law conflicts or operates to frustrate the purpose
of E.R.I.S.A.).
102 It is difficult at first glance to understand why E.R.I.S.A.'s preemption of state
community property law did not constitute a taking. If Mrs. Boggs truly had been vested in
her community share of her husband's retirement plan, as it stood at her death, then the
effect of the E.R.I.S.A. rule was to divest her estate of a vested interest in property by
taking away her ability to convey by will to whomever she wished. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833;
see e.g., Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
Apparently, the takings issue was debated at oral argument in Boggs. Randall Gingiss, The
E.R.I.S.A. Foxtrot, 18 VA. TAX REV., 417, 464 (1998). One possible explanation for why
the Court did not view ERISA pre-emption as resulting in a taking in Boggs is that the
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Because Vermont's civil union law creates vested property rights in
the partners, 10 3 federal tax law ought to recognize those property rights
and assess the tax burdens on the partners accordingly. In addition, parties
to a civil union are responsible for each other's support, pursuant to state
law. 104 The parties are not bound by private contract which can make a
difference under federal tax law.
1. Support Obligations
Alice and Betty have entered into a civil union. Betty is the sole
breadwinner, earning $100,000 a year, net of taxes. If Betty spends more
than $10,000 of her annual earnings on Alice a gift tax question arises. 10 5
However, since the state of Vermont imposes an obligation on Betty to
support Alice, 106 none of her annual wealth transfers to Alice will be taxed
7
as gifts so long as they are made for support. 10
"Support" for tax purposes includes payments for more than the bare
necessities of life. 10 8 In addition, support can include capital expenditures
Court does not always view each spouse as fully vested in his or her half of the community
property. Despite its decision in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the Court has often
held that community property may be viewed for tax purposes as owned by only one of the
spouses. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945) (ruling on Louisiana law);
United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367, 370 (1945) (ruling on Texas law). In Rompel, the
Court held that a 1942 estate tax provision that taxed one hundred percent of the community
property upon the death of the first spouse was constitutional. Id. The Court reasoned that
each spouse has sufficient control over one hundred percent of the property during his or
her respective lifetime to warrant taxing the full property when death ends that control. Id.
at 368-70.
103
See, e.g., Vermont's equitable distribution statute, which, although it applies only
at divorce, nonetheless can be viewed as creating current property rights in each spouse or
partner. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (2001). See infraat part II (B)(2) for a discussion
of whether rights via equitable distribution are treated as vested rights for income tax
purposes.
104 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(c).
105 Nancy J. Knauer, HeteronormativityandFederalTax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV.
129, 175 n.219 (1998) (citing Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992)).
106
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(c) (2001).
107
The legal obligation imposed by the Vermont statute would preclude a finding of
a "donative intent," necessary to conclude the wealth transfers were gifts.
See
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (stating "if the payment proceeds
primarily from 'the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,'. .. it is not a gift").
108
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,701 (Dec. 7, 1967) (Stating "the term 'support,' should not
be limited to those items which may be regarded as necessities"). The issue of what
qualifies as support usually arises in the context of a dependency exemption where the
taxpayer must prove more than a 50% contribution to the dependent's support. For an
illustration in this regard see Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,701 (Dec 7, 1967), Priv. Ltr. Rul.
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automobile. 109

such as a television set and an
Relying on Vermont's
requirement that she support Alice, Betty should be able to provide food,
clothing, housing,10 and some entertainment and travel without worrying
about gift taxes. I
Should Alice and Betty split up and Betty continue her support
obligation to Alice by paying alimony, another tax question arises: are the
post-divorce alimony payments to Alice taxable income or not? Alice and
Betty cannot rely on Sections 71 and 215 to claim that the payments are
income to Alice and deductible by Betty because those sections clearly
only apply to ex-spouses.1 1 1 However, the two should be able to rely on a
1917 United States Supreme Court decision that pronounces alimony paid
income because it arises not from contract,
by husband to wife nontaxable
1 12
but from the relationship.
2. Equitable Division of Propertyat Divorce
In 1984, Congress added Section 1041 to the Internal Revenue Code
providing that property transfers between spouses incident to divorce
trigger no income tax liability on the part of either spouse. 1 13 Before this
statute took effect, spouses had to contend with the realization rule set
forth in UnitedStates v. Davis114 in 1962.
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that property transfers incident to
divorce constituted a bargained-for exchange and were thus subject to
taxation. 115 As applied, the Davis rule taxed the transferorof appreciated
property (i.e., Mr. Davis) as though he had sold it in exchange for Mrs.
6703284770A (Mar. 28, 1967), and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6610204770A (Oct 20, 1966), all of

which define support to include payments for the benefit of the taxpayer's adult daughter in
the form of a wedding dress and accessories, trousseau, reception, honeymoon, flowers for
the church, reception, and bridal party.
109 Rev. Rul. 77-282, 1977-2 C.B. 52 (support for purposes of dependency

exemption).
nlo I have argued elsewhere, in the absence of an obligation to support, such
expenditures for joint consumption should not be treated as taxable gifts. Patricia A. Cain,
Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, I L. & SEXUALITY 97, 123-29 (1991).
However, not everyone agrees with my position.
III While section 215 does not mention the word "spouse" or "ex-spouse," it does
refer to section 71, I.R.C. § 215(b) (2001), which defines alimony as a payment received by

a spouse. § 71 (b)(I)(A).
112
113

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153-54 (1917).
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793

(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (2001)).
114

370 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1962) (holding Mr. Davis taxable on the gain realized when

he transferred appreciated stock in exchange for Mrs. Davis' release of inchoate marital
rights).
115

Id.
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Davis's release of her marital rights. 1 16 The decision was silent as to the
tax consequences to the transferee,(i.e., Mrs. Davis). The IRS, however,
ruled shortly thereafter that a wife who receives property at divorce in
exchange for her inchoate marital rights is not taxed.I 1 7
In the period between Davis and the enactment of section 1041,118 the
taxability of property settlements was determined on a case by case basis
with close attention paid to state law. 119 The question in each such case
was whether a realization event had occurred. 120 For example, if the
property division consisted solely of a severance of joint tenancy property
12 1
into tenancies in common, there would be no taxable event.
Furthermore, partitioning one jointly owned parcel of land into 2two
2
separately owned parcels would not be viewed as a taxable exchange. 1
To the extent state property law defined the rights of spouses in a way
that closely resembled that of joint tenants, divorcing spouses could argue
that rearranging their joint property interests was simply not a realization
event. The argument worked best in community property states where
earlier precedent could be cited in support of the non-realization
argument. 123 Then common law states began to characterize noncommunity marital property as equally vested in husband and wife during
the marriage so that divisions at divorce could be viewed as nontaxable
divisions of jointly owned property. 124 Although, not all states were

Id.
Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63. No rationale was given for this ruling. One
possible justification is that the "rights" that Mrs. Davis released were rights that she would
have otherwise enjoyed tax-free, e.g., the right of support and the right to inherit.
its This period was roughly between 1962 and 1984.
119 See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (asking whether division of property
incident to divorce when a state is not a community property state is a taxable event).
120
Id.
121
Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507 (severance of joint tenancy in stock followed
by issuance of two separate stock certificates).
122
Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
123
E.g., Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718, 719 (1935) (division of community
property at divorce not a taxable event upon which a loss could be recognized); see also
Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964-68 (1975), acq. in result, 1976-2 C.B. 1, affd
per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (unequal division is partly taxable, partly not
taxable); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 (equal division of community property at
divorce is not a taxable event).
124
E.g., Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295-97 (Okla. 1968)
(characterizing property as equally vested to prevent taxation in Collins v. Commissioner,
338 F. 2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968)); In re Question Submitted Concerning C.R.S. 1963, 41-1-5,
517 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. 1974) (characterizing property as equally vested to prevent
taxation in Imel v. UnitedStates, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975)).
116
117
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willing to view marital property as equally vested, 12 5 the United States
Supreme Court clearly
wanted the tax decision to be made on the basis of
126
state property law.
Finally, the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling in which it agreed
to treat approximately equal divisions of property at divorce as non-taxable
nonrealization events. 12 7 General Counsel Memorandum 37,716 explains
in part the I.R.S.'s rationale for treating married couples differently from
unrelated individuals:
[W]e believe that the interest of each spouse is in the
martial property as an entity. A divorce decree merely
severs the interest that each spouse held in the marital
property. Cofield v. Koehler, 207 F.Supp. 73 (D. Kan.
1962). This is true regardless of whether the marital
property is community property or jointly held
property.

12 8

As further justification for treating married couples differently, the
General Counsel Memorandum stated:
Note that there is no such larger entity to be partitioned in
an equal in value division of property held by unmarried
co-owners. At the time of divorce, all marital property is
disposed of. It would be rare if, upon divorce, married coowners would divide some of their jointly held property
while retaining a joint interest in other property.
Unmarried co-owners, however, may sever their interest in
some jointly owned property while retaining a joint
interest in other property. This difference is an important
factor in explaining the reason for the discrepancy in the
treatment of married and unmarried persons.
Also
important is the longstanding judicial precedent for
treating divisions of property held by married persons as
129
nontaxable.
Vermont's equitable distribution statute will apply at the "divorce" of
parties to a civil union. 130 If the parties agree to, or a judge enforces, an
125 E.g., Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757, 759-61 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying
Iowa law).
126 Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968) (remanding the Oklahoma case to
the appellate court after the Oklahoma Supreme Court had issued its ruling on the property
law issues).
127 Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
128 Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,716 (Oct. 5, 1978).
129 Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,716 at n.2 (Oct. 5, 1978).
130 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2001).
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approximately equal division of their property, then all of the case law and
administrative rulings that applied to spouses before Section 1041 was
enacted in 1984 ought to apply to taxpayers who dissolve a civil union.
The property division should not be a taxable event.
III. CHALLENGING THE TAX CODE
The previous parts of this article have demonstrated ways in which the
Internal Revenue Code, as it is currently drafted, might apply to taxpayers
who are parties to a civil union. The arguments I have made in favor of
applying positive tax rules to such couples are based on Vermont law that
creates rights and responsibilities that the federal tax law ought to
recognize and honor.
A more serious problem lies in the fact that even if federal tax law
were to recognize the rights and responsibilities of partners committed in a
civil union, it does not generally recognize the committed relationship of
any two people unless they are spouses in a marriage. 13 1 Parties to a civil
union are ideally situated to argue that the tax code's discrimination
against same-sex couples is unconstitutional. Because parties to a civil
union are treated just like spouses, 13 2 they necessarily meet the "similarly
situated" requirement for challenging a statute on equal protection
grounds. 13 3 They can argue that every time a taxing statute extends a
benefit (or a burden) to a spouse, that benefit (or burden) ought to be
extended to taxpayers in a committed civil union.
A primary hurdle for any such challenge, however, is that it is levied13at4
a tax statute. The taxing power is explicitly granted in the Constitution
and tax statutes enjoy a heavy presumption of constitutionality. 13 5 As one
court recently explained:
[a] tax statute's "presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a
classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes." ... "The burden is
on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negate
every conceivable basis which might support it." . . .
Finally, the rational basis justifying a statute against an
equal protection claim need not be stated in the statute or
See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2001).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2001).
"[Tihe Equal Protection Clause is 'essentially a direction that all persons similarly
133
situated shall be treated alike."' New York State Club Assoc. v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 17
(1988) (citing Cleburne v. Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
134
U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 8, cl. I.
135
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) ("Legislatures
have expecially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.").
131

132
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in its legislative history; it is sufficient that a court can
conceive of a reasonable justification for the statutory
136
distinction.
Vermont couples, relying on their civil union status, however, should
be able to bring strong equal protection challenges. For example, a
Vermont couple might challenge the taxability of employer-provided
health care benefits. As the Tax Code is currently drafted, employerprovided health care benefits are excluded from taxable income to the
extent they benefit the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or the taxpayer's
dependents. 1 37 But, payments to same-sex partners, even those subject to
Vermont's civil union law, are not exempt from tax. 138 This differential
tax rule not only punishes same-sex couples who rely on one partner's
employment to fund their health plan, but it also places an undue burden on
employers who provide such services by requiring them to keep a separate
set of records for married employees and for those who are parties to a
civil union.
What can possibly be the justification for such a provision?
Conceivable justifications might include (1) administrative ease - marriage
is a bright line, or (2) approval of marriage and disapproval of civil unions.
However, it is difficult to make the argument that administrative ease
justifies the discrimination since the primary burden of distinguishing
13
between tax-free and taxable payments is placed on the employer.
Besides, in Vermont, civil unions create a bright line as well. Moreover,
the second justification appears to be nothing more than an expression of
hostility toward same-sex couples. Such animus should not be sufficient to
justify a statute even under rational basis analysis. 14 0 Indeed, such animus,
which is evident throughout its legislative history, 14 1 is also an insufficient

justification for DOMA.
IV. CONCLUSION

Although most civil rights litigators tend to shy away from tax law,
Vermont's civil union statute gives public interest lawyers a unique

opportunity to fight for the equal rights of committed same-sex couples.
136

Estate of Kunze v. Commissioner, 233 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted).
I.R.C. § 105(b) (2001).
See id. (referring only to medical expenses incurred for medical care of a
"spouse," which is defined as only including "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or wife," 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2001)).
139
See I.R.C. § 3402 (2001).
137

138

See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1986).
Barbra A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionalityof the Defense ofMarriageAct in the
Wake ofRomer v. Evans, 32 NEw. ENG. L. REv. 263, 339-41 (1997).
140
141
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First, the Internal Revenue Service should be required to recognize the
reality of same-sex civil unions in the state of Vermont. Second, taxpayers
who are parties to civil unions should take advantage of their unique
standing to challenge the discriminatory provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code provisions that benefit spouses, but appear to exclude civil union
couples. There is no rational justification for such differential treatment in
a world in which civil unions are otherwise treated the same as marriage.
One could hope that a successful civil union challenge to the tax code
would also encourage legislators and administrators to rethink the role of
all families in the allocation of federal tax burdens.
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